UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/1325
22 November 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 NOVEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Today, 21 November 1994, the so-called Krajina Serbs, operating from within the United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) zones in the Republic of Croatia, have continued and intensified their offensive against the Bihać pocket safe area. Over 10,000 shells of all calibres have been fired into the Bihać pocket safe area from rebel Serb positions within the UNPA zones within the Republic of Croatia.

As a result of these attacks from the direction of Licko Petrovo Selo (UNPA-Republic of Croatia)/Zivalj (Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and Licko Petrovo Selo (UNPA-Republic of Croatia)/Izacic (Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), the so-called Krajina Serbs have destroyed and occupied within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina the villages of Veliki Skocaj, Mali Skocaj and Medjudrazje and the village of Zavalje, which is 1.5 km from Bihać town.

We ask the Security Council to seriously consider whether the focus over the last couple of days on air attacks by the so-called Krajina Serbs and the debate regarding whether the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) could respond, under then applicable resolutions, within the UNPA zones of the Republic of Croatia has, in fact, deflected attention away from the much more dangerous and destructive cross-border attacks by so-called Krajina Serb artillery, tanks and infantry. While the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina very much appreciates the latest NATO action, we must point out the greater urgency and danger to civilians, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and sovereignty resulting from artillery that is relentlessly fired across the border and from tanks and infantry that have already invaded our Republic, and continue to violate not only the safe area but also our territorial integrity. If the latest United Nations and NATO action is to be perceived as credible and effective in really confronting these multiple violations of international law and order by the so-called Krajina Serbs, then these Krajina Serb forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be the first to be confronted.

May I ask you for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1326
24 November 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 NOVEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit the English translation of a note verbale dated 21 November 1994 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Note verbale dated 21 November 1994 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran and, referring to notes Nos. 126334/8/1/23 of 19 September 1994 and 126351/8/1/23 of 25 September 1994 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq addressed to the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Baghdad, has the honour to present the following information:

1. According to the attached border map, the flag of the Republic of Iraq had been installed in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In notes Nos. 713/8014 of 17 August 1994, 713/8852 of 3 September 1994, 713/9640 of 17 September 1994 and 713/10249 of 27 September 1994, the Government of the Republic of Iraq was called upon to take immediate measures to remove them and to refrain from repeating such provocative and aggressive acts.

2. During a lapse of three months, the Government of Iraq not only failed to take appropriate measures in this respect, but intentionally continued its aggression against the territorial integrity of the Islamic Republic of Iran by war-like positioning of its troops and violation of the cease-fire, and also changed the flag with a new one. Thus, in order to preserve its territorial integrity, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran took it upon itself to remove manifestations of the aggression.

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq is, herewith, informed of the legal measure of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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

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GENERAL

S/1994/1327
22 November 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 NOVEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to enclose herewith the letter dated 22 November 1994 by the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, addressed to you.

I would kindly request your assistance in distributing this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

94-46168 (E) 221194 231194

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Annex

Letter dated 22 November 1994 from the President of the Republic of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council

May I express to you my satisfaction with the effective action of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air force on 21 November 1994 in the occupied part of Croatia, which was undertaken upon request of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in accordance with Security Council resolution 958 (1994).

Taking into consideration the urgent need of protection of UNPROFOR troops and the necessity of the continuing pressure on part of the Serbian forces, who are unwilling to accept the peaceful solution, the Republic of Croatia has approved in principle the extension of NATO close air support under the condition that the operations are conducted in full respect of the sovereign rights of Croatia and in full coordination with Croatian authorities. I have informed the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Willy Claes, accordingly.

We consider that conditions for UNPROFOR control of the borders of the Republic of Croatia with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which coincide with the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), and the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) have now been met, and that UNPROFOR should at this time take over the control of these borders according to Security Council resolution 769 (1992).

The situation in the United Nations safe-area in Bihać and around it is further deteriorating, because the rebel Serb forces from UNPAs in Croatia are attacking these areas. Therefore the decisive air attacks by NATO and firm control of the borders are the only measures which will efficiently stop these aggressive acts. We consider that in this way clear expression of support for a political solution of the crisis will be given which could achieve a lasting peace in the region.

May I therefore ask you, as the President of the Security Council of the United Nations, to undertake resolute measures for enforcement of all relevant Security Council resolutions which could lead to the end of the war crisis and to the establishment of lasting peace in this part of the world.

(Signed) Franjo TUDJMAN
President of the
Republic of Croatia

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NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/1994/1328
22 November 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 NOVEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Since 9 November, my Government and mission have done our utmost to keep the Security Council informed on the major hostilities being directed against the Bihać region safe area, especially cross-border hostilities by the so-called Krajina Serbs emanating from within the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in the Republic of Croatia. Formal communications from our Government to the Council on the issue included letters dated as follows, and pointing out, respectively, that:

- 9 November; two planes from the UNPAs firing missiles into north-west Bihać, confirmed by the United Nations spokesman;

- 11 November (from Foreign Minister Ljubljankić); "synchronized activities of the Serb forces from both the territories of our Republic and the UNPA zones in neighbouring Croatia". Also pointed out that: "For the second consecutive day the safe area of Bihać is subject to attacks from the air by the aggressor's forces planes that take off from Udbine airport in the UNPA zones in the Republic of Croatia.";

- 11 November (two letters from President Izetbegovic); air and artillery attacks from the UNPAs, the second letter calling for an emergency session of the Security Council;

- 14 November; missile attacks on Cazin and Bihać by the so-called Bosnian Serbs, the massing of "Krajina Serb" troops near the town of Pljesivica, and the occupation of two areas within the Bihać pocket safe area by Krajina Serb forces;

- 16 November (two letters); attacks from the area of Slunj and Plitvice Lakes and Lokovo Mountains as well as separate attacks from UNPAs against Velika Kladusa, heavy shelling of Velika Kladusa and Bihać by multiple rocket launchers and guided missiles supplemented by "Krajina Serb" helicopter gunships, combined Serb forces breaching of Bosnian defence lines and capturing of Siljikovaca village, and the illegal fuel shipments to the "Krajina Serbs";

- 18 November; two "Krajina Serb" aircraft dropping cassette bombs and napalm, as well as Volhov missile attacks;

- 19 November; two planes from the UNPAs attacking civilians and endangering United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) soldiers in Cazin;

- 20 November; intensified "Krajina Serb" offensive against Bihać with infantry, tanks and artillery, and the taking of several villages by the "Krajina Serb" forces;

- 21 November; intensified "Krajina Serb" attack against the Bihać pocket safe area, with 10,000 shells fired from the UNPAs and destruction and occupation of several villages in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the "Krajina Serb" forces;

Also, formal communications to the Council from the Croatian Government and Mission on the issue confirmed the above violations as well as others.

Furthermore, the Security Council in its:

- 13 November presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/66) confirmed the "Krajina Serb" cross-border violations;

- 18 November presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/69) again confirmed "Krajina Serb" cross-border violations, characterized by shelling, it also confirmed the "Krajina Serb" impeding of UNPROFOR freedom of movement and "Krajina Serb" obstruction of humanitarian aid;

- 19 November Security Council resolution (resolution 958 (1994)) reaffirming the potential necessity of close air support in the UNPAs as a result of continued "Krajina Serb" cross-border violations.

In the light of the above information and the subsequent Security Council actions, it is beyond a doubt that the "Krajina Serb" forces have been fully engaged in cross-border attacks against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as having at least a significant number of forces on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no way that the UNPROFOR command cannot know of these forces.

Serb forces, no matter what kind, are only 1 kilometre from Bihać town and its 50,000 inhabitants. The cross-border and other shelling attacks continue against the entire region, but especially against Bihać town, threatening the region's biggest population centre as well as the peace-keepers therein.

If the UNPROFOR command has not received calls for help from the Bangladeshi peace-keepers trapped in the pocket, my Government has.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

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S/1994/1329
22 November 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 NOVEMBER 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, the statement of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, dated 21 November 1994 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

94-46208 (E) 221194 231194

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Annex

The federal Government most strongly condemns the unjustified and irresponsible bombing of Udbina airport by North Atlantic Treaty Organization planes, and views it as the latest evidence of the one-sided and biased approach that the Security Council, under the influence of countries having their own strategic interests in the region, is exhibiting in the Yugoslav crisis. Such a course of action plays into the hands of extremists, threatens to render further peace efforts senseless, and leads the entire Yugoslav crisis into a new dark period, perhaps even to a war option of larger proportions. The federal Government therefore calls on all Member States of the Council to reconsider the decision on the expansion of the war operations beyond the territory of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only the abandoning of that militant course can avert an unfavourable chain of events and save the peace process.

The federal Government remains deeply convinced that the civil war in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be resolved by its intensification, let alone its spreading to neighbouring areas, but exclusively by political means and just and lasting solutions based on compromise. In keeping with its peaceful policy, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will continue to strive towards such solutions.

The federal Government expresses its deepest concern over the one-sided and partial decision of the Security Council. Like previous decisions in critical moments of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, made on the basis of unverified information or planted misinformation, the Council reacted hastily on this occasion as well, trusting exclusively the information of only one side. The federal Government believes that there are no reasons nor trustworthy facts to accuse the Republic of Serb Krajina of involvement in the civil war in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, nor for complaints regarding its attitude vis-à-vis forces of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The fact is taken lightly that since the adoption of the Vance Plan there has been not a single incident on the part of the Republic of Serb Krajina against UNPROFOR personnel or property. The fact is completely ignored that some 70,000 Moslems found refuge and protection in the Republic of Serb Krajina, fleeing the terror of the so-called Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council and the international community have completely ignored their plight and destiny. The Council is discriminating among the Moslems themselves, protecting only those under the power of the so-called Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while ignoring the Moslem population who fled to the Republic of Serb Krajina.

The fast intervention of the Security Council in favour of the so-called Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the pretext of securing zones under United Nations protection, is at variance with the passive attitude of the Council a month earlier, when that Army abused the Bihac safe area to prepare and launch large-scale offensive military operations against the Army and citizens of the Republic of Srpska. The world Organization has, by its decision, instead of protecting Krajina, which enjoys its protection, put Krajina's peace and security in jeopardy.

Particularly worrisome is the fact that the decision on extending air strikes to include the Republic of Serb Krajina was made at a moment when the peace process in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina is seriously endangered by the decision of the United States of America to lift the embargo on imports of weapons for Bosnian Moslem and Croat forces, and when the Republic of Croatia is toughening its stance in negotiations with the Republic of Serb Krajina, making ultimatums and repeatedly reiterating threats on the so-called reintegration of Krajina by force.

Accordingly, the decision of the Security Council cannot be interpreted otherwise than as enabling the escalation of military activities in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina and their dangerous spreading outside the borders of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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A/49/685
S/1994/1330
22 November 1994

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 51
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 21 November 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Osman Ertuğ, representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex, which contains a letter dated 21 November 1994 sent to you by His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İnal BATU
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

94-46214 (E) 251194 271194

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ANNEX

Letter dated 21 November 1994 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ
to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a letter addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Rauf Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, in connection with a previous letter addressed to you by Mr. Glafcos Clerides, leader of the Greek Cypriot community, which was circulated in the annex to General Assembly and Security Council document A/49/648-S/1994/1263 dated 8 November 1994.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its enclosure could be circulated as a document of the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Appendix

Letter dated 21 November 1994 from Mr. Rauf Denktas to the Secretary-General

It was not my intention to write you a letter following the informal consultations between 18 and 31 October 1994, but after having read Mr. Clerides' letter to you of 8 November 1994, which has been circulated as a United Nations document (A/49/648-S/1994/1263, annex), I felt that there was now a need to do so in order to set the record right.

I was disappointed to observe that the Greek Cypriot side had taken initiatives, following the conclusion of the informal consultations, which cannot be compatible with the wish and vision of peace, stability, welfare and cooperation that we envisage within the context of a partnership solution. I firmly believe that, as the leaders of the two communities destined to share the same homeland, Mr. Clerides and I should first respect each other and work towards creating an environment of mutual trust and confidence compatible with the above wish. This being so, I wish to assure you that it is not my intention in this letter to vilify the Greek Cypriot side or its distinguished leader, but to brief you directly on the views I expressed and the suggestions I made during the informal consultations.

As you are no doubt aware, immediately after receipt of your letter of 10 October 1994, I informed your Deputy Special Representative in Cyprus that I was ready and willing to engage in this historic mission. I made my preparations for the consultations on the basis of your suggestion that we should hold "a number of informal consultations ... with a view to exploring in a practical and concrete manner ways in which progress might be made both in respect of the implementation of the confidence-building measures and the long-contemplated overall settlement of the Cyprus problem".

I took this suggestion as an indication of the agenda at the consultations, or at least, as a guidance to the subjects to be discussed.

In our first meeting I tried to set a conciliatory tone for the consultations and explained to Mr. Clerides that the Cyprus question had come to a turning-point that we must both be aware of our historic duties and responsibilities. I pointed out that we were both approaching the end of our political lives and that our peoples and the international community were expecting a breakthrough from us. I stressed that your invitation for informal consultations provided us with a rare opportunity to realize this breakthrough.

During the consultations I especially emphasized the need to explore, in a practical and concrete manner, ways in which progress might be made in respect of the implementation of the confidence-building measures package. I did this because I fully share your assessment set out in paragraph 63 of your report of 19 November 1992 (S/24830), where you stress that: "It appears from the recent joint meetings that there is a deep crisis of confidence between the two sides. It is difficult to envisage any successful outcome to the talks for as long as this situation prevails."

Furthermore, the subject of exploring ways through which the confidence-building measures package might be implemented was the first of the two subjects you suggested we discuss, during the consultations, in your letter of 10 October 1994.

I made it abundantly clear during the consultations that, based on your repeated assessments, we had to immediately address the issue of trust and confidence if we were to expect any successful outcome to the talks on the long-contemplated overall settlement, and frequently reminded Mr. Clerides that I was ready and willing to conclude the confidence-building measures agreement to achieve that objective. I pointed out during the consultations that the signing of the confidence-building measures agreement and its implementation would enable us to overcome the obstacle put in our way by the European Court of Justice ruling. I also stated during the consultations that I am prepared to accept the procedure you have suggested for the implementation of the confidence-building measures package in the report contained in your letter of 28 June 1994 addressed to the President of the Security Council. I specifically stressed that we had to benefit from the constructive evaluation in your above-stated letter where you say: "I concluded that there had now been sufficient progress for the United Nations to implement the package on the basis of the 21 March paper and subsequent clarifications." I went as far as saying that this was the first time in the post-1974 phase of the 31-year-old crisis in Cyprus when the two sides had the chance and opportunity of concluding an agreement that would contain practical elements and would be implemented. I pleaded that this opportunity should not be missed.

When Mr. Clerides said during the consultations that he had problems of access to the fenced area of Varosha within the context of the United Nations-negotiated confidence-building measures, I made a proposal to him that entailed further sacrifices for the Turkish Cypriot community. I am confident that this proposal has been duly noted by your representatives in Cyprus. The response of Mr. Clerides was that he did not want to discuss the confidence-building measures until after a settlement.

As per the second request contained in your letter of 10 October 1994, I also engaged in consultations with Mr. Clerides regarding the issues of an overall settlement. In view of Mr. Clerides' refusal to discuss the confidence-building measures package until after a settlement, I likewise could have said that I, in turn, did not wish to discuss issues of the federal settlement until after an agreement on the confidence-building measures. I did not, however, take this negative stand.

At the initial stage of our consultations regarding an overall settlement, I reminded Mr. Clerides of the assessment of your Special Representative Mr. Joe Clark, following his latest visit, which he later reiterated during the press interview following his meeting with the Security Council on 10 October 1994, that we were approaching a kind of impasse in Cyprus and that this had two main reasons: (a) the European Court of Justice ruling of 5 July 1994; and (b) the resolution of the Parliament of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus of 28 August 1994. I repeatedly reconfirmed to Mr. Clerides that our objective for a negotiated settlement and for the negotiation process had not changed; that this objective was the realization of a bi-communal and

bi-zonal federal solution; and that the second obstacle pointed out by Mr. Joe Clark for a negotiated settlement did not therefore, really exist.

I explained to Mr. Clerides that I was prepared to engage in a process of give-and-take, like the concept of "horse trading" suggested by your Deputy Special Representative Mr. Feissel, and that in order to realize the above-mentioned objective we had to approach the subject within the context of the following headings: constitutional aspects, displaced persons, security and guarantees and territorial adjustments. In line with this approach I made the bold and creative suggestions to Mr. Clerides that we could work on the basis of such formulas as "land for peace" and "land for a viable solution". I am sure you will appreciate that these suggestions provide a significant opening for a negotiated settlement.

I have noted the confirmation of your Deputy Special Representative Mr. Feissel that during the consultations Mr. Clerides has accepted the Turkish Cypriot definition of limited sovereignty based on the Swiss model, namely that: "The federated States are sovereign in so far as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal constitution."

Mr. Clerides' acceptance of the above definition of sovereignty, however, is conditional on the Turkish Cypriot side's acceptance to support as from now the unilateral application for European Union (EU) membership submitted in 1990 by the Greek Cypriot Administration under the title of "the Government of the Republic of Cyprus", with the proviso that, if accepted, it would be the "Federal Republic of Cyprus" which would enter the EU. This condition, unfortunately, entails legal, political and economic difficulties and complications which have already been explained in detail during the consultations and which make the practicality of this offer impossible.

As an alternative approach, I proposed to Mr. Clerides that if we realized our objective of establishing the federation, I would go along with the provision laid down in the "Set of Ideas" regarding the EU membership of the Federal Republic, as agreed to by both myself and Mr. Vassiliou. Paragraph 92 of the "Set of Ideas" lays down that: "Matters related to the membership of the Federal Republic in the European Economic Community will be discussed and agreed to, and will be submitted for the approval of the two communities in separate referendums."

I reconfirmed at the consultations that I would also go along with the provisions of the "Set of Ideas" regarding the demilitarization of the Federal Republic and the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces.

I repeatedly stressed that the implementation of the confidence-building measures package would generate an environment of trust and confidence that, in turn, would facilitate the establishment of the federal government.

In order to remove the suspicion of the Greek Cypriot side that after the conclusion of the confidence-building measures agreement we would no longer be interested in an overall settlement, I proposed to Mr. Clerides that we both commit ourselves to commence negotiations on an overall settlement on the day the confidence-building measures agreement is endorsed by the Security Council.

As proof of our sincerity in and commitment to a negotiated settlement, I made the following concrete proposal to Mr. Clerides on 31 October 1994 in respect of both the confidence-building measures and an overall settlement:

"(a) The two leaders have agreed on the package of confidence-building measures. They have decided to sign the agreement on ... (date). (Let us fix a date in November.)

"(b) The two leaders have decided to commence talks between the two sides, on the date the Security Council endorses the confidence-building measures agreement and in accordance with the 'integrated whole' principle, with a view to attaining a comprehensive settlement on a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal basis.

"(c) The two leaders have decided to establish a committee of experts, with a view to concluding the procedures relating to the implementation of the package of confidence-building measures.

"(d) It is envisaged that the confidence-building measures committee concludes its work within 15 days.

"(e) At the same time, it has been decided that a committee of experts be established for the purpose of evaluating the views of the two sides on a comprehensive settlement put forward during the informal consultations between the two leaders.

"(f) It is envisaged that the comprehensive settlement committee submits a progress report within one month.

"(g) The two leaders have decided to come together in some 15 days, under the auspices of Mr. Feissel, in order to review the results, upon the completion of the work by the confidence-building measures committee, and to conclude the preparatory work on the confidence-building measures agreement."

I very well know that you will be evaluating my consultations with Mr. Clerides, on the basis of the report that you will be getting from your Deputy Special Representative Mr. Feissel. I want to stress again, however, that the modalities for the implementation of the confidence-building measures, as such, were not in fact taken up during the consultations and that reference during the consultations to this matter was limited only to instances when I invited and reminded Mr. Clerides that we also needed to discuss the package.

The points and positions I have outlined in this letter are from talking points of the consultations which I have already handed to your Deputy Special Representative Mr. Feissel. I had requested Mr. Feissel to give a copy of the talking points of our meeting of 31 October 1994 to Mr. Clerides. I am confident that these talking points have been brought to your attention.

In conclusion, I wish to confirm that I continue to support your mission of good offices; that I am prepared and willing to sign the confidence-building measures agreement; that I believe that the implementation of the confidence-

building measures agreement would help in facilitating an overall solution; that we are fully committed to a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal solution; and that I am always available and prepared to engage in face-to-face negotiations with Mr. Clerides.

In this connection, I wish to assure you that the Turkish Cypriot side does have the political will and readiness to reach a negotiated settlement with the Greek Cypriot side and to bring an equitable solution and lasting peace to both peoples of our beautiful island.

Thank you again for your kind assistance.

(Signed) Rauf R. DENKTAŞ
President

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General Assembly
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A/49/686
S/1994/1331
22 November 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 79
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE
QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING
OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 21 November 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 21 November 1994, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Osman Ertuğ, representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 79, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İnal BATU
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 21 November 1994 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ
to the Secretary-General

With reference to a statement made by the Greek Cypriot representative at the meeting of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) on 17 November 1994, on agenda item 79, entitled "Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects", I have the honour to bring to your kind attention the following in exercise of my right of reply which I can only present in writing due to reasons that are well known.

It is ironic that, in that statement, Mr. Shambos sheds crocodile tears on "casualties suffered by peace-keepers in 1974" at a time when Greek Cypriot schoolchildren and others, at the instigation and encouragement of his own leadership, are busy attacking and injuring United Nations peace-keepers in violent demonstrations along the buffer zone and our borders. As you are aware, in the massive demonstrations that were staged on 15 November 1994, two United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) personnel were injured by the Greek Cypriot demonstrators, along with Turkish Cypriot civilians and a number of military personnel, as also stated by the United Nations spokesman on peace-keeping operations at the noon briefing on the same date.

The demonstrations have again shown which side harbours deep-seated hostility and aggressive intentions against the other, and who has been on the defensive in Cyprus since the beginning of the conflict in 1963. I believe that Mr. Shambos does a disservice not only to the cause of a negotiated peace in Cyprus, but also to the memory of his own late leader, Archbishop Makarios, by trying to deny or ignore the following passages from his statement made before the Security Council on 19 July 1974, in which he unequivocally named Greece, and not Turkey, as the invader and the aggressor in Cyprus:

> "It is clearly an invasion from outside, in flagrant violation of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. The so-called coup was the work of the Greek officers staffing and commanding the National Guard." (emphasis added) (Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, 1780th meeting, para. 18)

> "As I have already stated, the events in Cyprus do not constitute an internal matter of the Greeks of Cyprus. The Turks of Cyprus are also affected. The coup of the Greek junta is an invasion, and from its consequences the whole people of Cyprus suffers, both Greeks and Turks." (emphasis added) (ibid., para. 32)

It is clear from the above that the events in which some United Nations peace-keepers lost their lives in the line of duty, both during the events of 1974 and before then, were caused by the Greek Cypriot side. The responsibility for such tragic loss of life, therefore, solely rests on the shoulders of the Greek Cypriot side, and whoever may have aided and abetted them in the bloody campaign to achieve enosis, union with Greece. It is also not forgotten that

numerous United Nations soldiers were murdered in cold blood by the Greek Cypriots between 1963 and 1974, allegedly for helping the then beleaguered Turkish Cypriots.

Despite the lack of any formal legal framework between the Turkish Cypriot side and UNFICYP, our side has always given its consent to the deployment and functioning of UNFICYP on its territory and has always cooperated with it in the performance of its duties. It is the Greek Cypriot side, which, contrary to its public posture, has again been creating immense difficulties for UNFICYP in maintaining the status quo, most notably by staging violent demonstrations and violations of the buffer zone such as the above, unnecessarily raising tensions in the island and also putting new strains on the process of peacemaking within the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General. This fact is indicative of the Greek Cypriot side's two-faced approach to the negotiations and its lack of political will to settle the issue.

I would be grateful if the present letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 79, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1332
23 November 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND SPANISH

Colombia, Mexico, Spain, Venezuela and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 637 (1989) of 27 July 1989,

Recalling also its resolutions 693 (1991) of 20 May 1991, 714 (1991) of 30 September 1991, 729 (1992) of 14 January 1992, 784 (1992) of 30 October 1992, 791 (1992) of 30 November 1992, 832 (1993) of 27 May 1993, 888 (1993) of 30 November 1993 and 920 (1994) of 26 May 1994, and recalling also the statement of the President of the Council of 16 September 1994 (S/PRST/1994/54),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 31 October 1994 (S/1994/1212),

Having considered also the report of the Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups of 28 July 1994, as contained in the letter of the Secretary-General dated 22 October 1994 (S/1994/989),

Noting the request of the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) for a further extension of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) in the joint declaration dated 4 October 1994, as contained in the letter of the Secretary-General of 10 October 1994 (S/1994/1144),

Concerned by delays in implementing several important elements of the Peace Accords, particularly those regarding the National Civil Police and the completion of demobilization of the National Police, as well as those related to: the transfer of lands, the implementation of programmes to facilitate the reintegration into civilian society of ex-combatants and war disabled, the problems of human settlements, the reform of the judicial and electoral systems, and several recommendations of the Commission on the Truth,

Noting with appreciation the accomplishments of ONUSAL to date and the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and ONUSAL to support the full implementation of the agreements signed by the Government of El Salvador and FMLN to maintain and consolidate peace and promote reconciliation in El Salvador,

Welcoming the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General to contain the costs of ONUSAL,

Welcoming the continuing commitment by all concerned directed towards reconciliation, stability and development in political life in El Salvador, as noted by the Secretary-General in his report of 31 October 1994,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 31 October 1994;

2. Reaffirms the importance of full and timely implementation of all aspects of the Peace Accords, including the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth, and appropriate follow-up to the findings of the Joint Group for Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups;

3. Expresses concern that important elements of the Peace Accords remain only partially implemented;

4. Calls upon all concerned to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General's Special Representative and ONUSAL in their task of verifying implementation by the parties of their commitments;

5. Urges the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN to redouble their efforts to comply with the "Agreement on a timetable for the implementation of the most important agreements pending" so as to complete implementation of all aspects of the Peace Accords within the period of the timetable and requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on a regular basis of the status of implementation of outstanding commitments and ONUSAL operations;

6. Urges all States and the international institutions engaged in the fields of development and finance to contribute promptly and generously in support of the implementation of all aspects of the Peace Accords, as requested jointly by the Government of El Salvador and FMLN;

7. Approves the recommendations by the Secretary-General in his report of 31 October 1994 regarding the implementation by ONUSAL of its mandate;

8. Decides to extend the mandate of ONUSAL for one final period until 30 April 1995;

9. Requests also the Secretary-General to report by 31 March 1995 on ONUSAL, including on the fulfilment and completion of its mandate and on modalities for its withdrawal, to be completed by 30 April 1995, in a manner consistent with the effective performance of its duties;

10. Reaffirms the commitment undertaken by the United Nations to verify full implementation of the Peace Accords; welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to consider ways for the United Nations to discharge its remaining verification duties; and invites the Secretary-General, in consultation with competent specialized agencies, regional organizations and Member States, to prepare modalities for further assistance to El Salvador, within the framework of the Peace Accords, for the period after 30 April 1995;

11. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1333
23 November 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 NOVEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the memorandum on the Georgian-Abkhaz negotiations held at Geneva from 15 to 18 November 1994 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) P. CHKHEIDZE
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative

94-46441 (E) 251194 251194 281194

/...

Annex

[Original: Russian]

Memorandum of the Georgian delegation to the negotiations at Geneva, 15-18 November 1994, issued at Geneva on 18 November 1994

A year has elapsed since negotiations began in Geneva on a settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia. What have the participants in the negotiations brought to this meeting?

1. It has become evident that the armed conflict imposed on the Republic of Georgia was planned in advance by certain political circles in the Autonomous Republic with a view to carrying through the separatist policy launched as early as 1989 and reflected in the adoption of a number of unconstitutional acts rejecting the jurisdiction of the Republic of Georgia in the territory of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic.

2. Relying on the support of certain economic, military and even State structures in the Russian Federation and the Confederation of Caucasian Mountain Peoples, Abkhaz separatist-inclined forces were able to transform legal excesses into military excesses and obtain temporary control over almost the whole territory of Abkhazia.

3. Errors on the part of the military leadership of the Republic of Georgia gave the separatists an opportunity to unleash an armed conflict, involving thousands of mercenary soldiers from the Northern Caucasus and other parts of Russia and the most advanced military equipment.

A proper evaluation of the war has yet to be made, but already the question of responsibility is on the agenda in Georgia. Unfortunately, similar steps are not being taken by the Abkhaz side.

4. From the very outset, the Republic of Georgia has endeavoured to put a stop to the bloodshed. Controlling two thirds of the territory of Abkhazia, the Government of Georgia suspended military action and participated in the negotiations in Moscow which resulted in the drafting of the Agreement of 3 September 1992.

5. Starting on 1 October, however, the separatist forces, having used the cease-fire to build up their forces, launched active military operations, accompanied by terrible mass murders, ethnic cleansing and the forced deportation of the Georgian population in the area around the town of Gagra. Subsequently, methodically violating, one after another, the agreements reached on a cease-fire and the reduction of weapons and armed forces, the Abkhaz party to the conflict continued to pursue ethnic cleansing in the areas it had captured. Following the capture of the town of Sukhumi - which, by agreement, was unarmed - by the separatist forces, the overwhelming majority of which consisted of mercenaries, almost the entire territory of Abkhazia was under the temporary control of the separatists based in Gudauta.

6. From the very outset of the armed conflict, the Government of the Russian Federation recognized and guaranteed the inviolability of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia (the Moscow Agreement of 3 September 1992 and other Georgian-Russian agreements and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation). The Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, however, openly sided with the separatists and promoted an escalation of the conflict.

7. The inviolability of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia was recognized also by the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, on the basis of which the negotiations on a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia were initiated, called for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia.

Extract from resolution 896 (1994):

"The Security Council,

...

"4. Calls upon all concerned to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia and stresses the importance it attaches to such respect;".

8. The Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the organs of CSCE and CIS have rejected and continue to reject the attempt by the Abkhaz party to the conflict to legalize the situation which has developed and to legitimize the seizure of the territory of Abkhazia from the Republic of Georgia.

In calling for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, the Security Council of the United Nations has repeatedly stressed that progress on the political status of Abkhazia must be made "respecting fully the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia" (resolution 896 (1994), para. 5).

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his report to the Security Council of 3 March 1994, clearly defined the position of the international community of States:

"29. ... It has been made clear to the Abkhaz side ... that independence achieved by force of arms is unacceptable to the international community" (S/1994/253 of 3 March 1994).

Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali also stated this during his visit to Tbilisi from 31 October to 2 November 1994.

The documents of CSCE and CIS express similar views.

In the Declaration on the maintenance of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of States members of CIS

(15 April 1994), the Parties stated that they would "ensure compliance, in their mutual relations, with the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of frontiers" (para. 1) and "refrain ... from support for and the use of separatism against the territorial integrity and inviolability and the political independence of any State member of the Commonwealth" (para. 2), and confirmed that "the seizure of territory by force cannot be recognized and that the occupation of the territory of a State cannot be used to gain international recognition or to force a change in its legal status" (para. 3).

In a statement of the same date, the Council on Collective Security emphasized that any peacemaking operation in Abkhazia must be committed "to an early solution to the problem of refugees, to respect for human rights and national minorities", and reaffirmed its commitment to the "principle of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia and the guaranteeing of the statehood of Abkhazia".

10. Thus, the claim of the Abkhaz side that it is participating in the negotiations on behalf of an independent State is untenable, since legally Abkhazia remains part of the Republic of Georgia and temporary armed control over almost the entire territory of Abkhazia has not gained, nor will it gain, legitimacy in the eyes of either the Republic of Georgia or the international community as a whole.

The only circumstance which has arisen following the separatist coup is that the territory illegally occupied by armed formations and temporarily under the control of separatist forces is a party to the armed conflict. In the search for a peaceful solution to the conflict, it is, of course, essential to take the position of that party into account, but in no way as an independent political entity.

11. One important factor which is a matter of concern to the whole international community is the fate of the refugees and displaced persons. This problem concerns above all the Georgian population of Abkhazia, which has been subjected to "ethnic cleansing", mass shootings, torture, rape and forced deportation, as a result of which 250,000 people have left the territory of Abkhazia, more than 6,000 have been killed, thousands of homes have been burned, hundreds of villages have been wiped off the face of the earth and residential areas in Gagra, Sukhumi, Ochamchire and Gali have been destroyed.

Already in 1993, in a statement dated 13 October, the Government of the Russian Federation placed the responsibility for ethnic cleansing directed against the non-Abkhaz population with the "Abkhaz authorities".

In a working paper submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. A. Eide, to the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/36 of 6 July 1994), it was clearly stated that in Abkhazia "the challenge to the territorial integrity of Georgia has been accompanied by processes of ethnic cleansing" (para. 31).

In Abkhazia, a classic example of "ethnic cleansing", recognized by the General Assembly of the United Nations as "a form of genocide", that is to say,

a crime against humanity (resolution 47/121 of 18 December 1992) has taken, and is still taking, place.

The fact that a year has elapsed and no arrangements have yet been made for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, since the Abkhaz side is doing its utmost to prevent the mass return of those who have been forcibly expelled, even using terror against the few still remaining in the Gali and other districts of Abkhazia and against the recently returned civilians, is evidence that ethnic cleansing is continuing and that the Abkhaz side is doing everything possible to disrupt the process of the return of refugees organized by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and to spin it out over many years, not allowing the restoration of the democratic structure of Abkhazia where, without the Georgian population, which comprised 47 per cent of the inhabitants, no single question about the State structure can be resolved.

The request by the Security Council that the refugees and displaced persons be allowed to return to their homes "without preconditions" is being effectively disregarded by the Abkhaz side (resolution 896 (1994)).

Moreover, an attempt is being made to settle Abkhazia with people of so-called Abkhaz origin from Turkey, Syria and other countries, with mercenary soldiers who, as a reward, are given the houses of Georgians free of charge.

The United Nations Security Council condemned "any attempt to change the demographic composition of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, including by repopulating it with persons not previously resident there" (resolution 896 (1994)).

This process, however, is not being monitored at all and the promise made by Mr. V. Ardzinba to reward the mercenaries with "citizenship and housing" is being consistently fulfilled (Izvestiya, 19 October 1993).

On the face of it, it is clear that an attempt is being made by the Abkhaz side to gain time, to discourage those expelled from returning to their homes and, after changing the demographic structure to its own advantage, to hold a "democratic referendum" in the depopulated land of Abkhazia.

This conclusion is confirmed by the statement by the Abkhaz side of 16 November 1994 to the effect that the question of the return of the refugees cannot be resolved until agreement has been reached on the principles of the political status of Abkhazia on the basis of recognition of Abkhazia as an independent subject of international law by the Republic of Georgia.

By setting conditions which are clearly unacceptable to the Republic of Georgia, the United Nations, CSCE and CIS, the Abkhaz side is openly pursuing a policy designed to disrupt the return of the refugees and displaced persons.

The Head of State of Georgia, Mr. E. Shevardnadze, and the Parliament of the Republic of Georgia have on more than one occasion appealed to the international community, emphasizing the very great danger inherent in the

disruption of the return of the refugees, which could have untold tragic consequences.

12. It is highly significant that, as a result of ethnic cleansing and the "sterilization" of the territory of Abkhazia of its Georgian population, as a result of the flight from Abkhazia of almost half the Abkhaz people - those who do not wish to be associated with the excesses rife in their country - and as a result of the departure from Abkhazia of many Russians, Armenians, Greeks, Estonians and others, four fifths of the population of the Autonomous Republic now find themselves outside Abkhazia. This raises the question: to what extent is the current reactionary political regime entitled to speak on behalf of the multi-ethnic population of Abkhazia? What right does a mere fraction of the Abkhaz people, a people which itself only constitutes one sixth of the population of the region, have to decide the fate of Abkhazia?!

13. A comprehensive settlement of the conflict has proved impossible without the deployment of peacemaking forces, one of whose priority tasks must be to facilitate the safe return of those who have been expelled.

Since the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations were unable to carry out such an operation, the peacemaking mission was undertaken by the Commonwealth of Independent States, in large measure by the Russian Federation, whose troops have been deployed in and near the conflict zone for the past six months. The force commanders are endeavouring to create the conditions for the return of refugees. To date, however, there has been no effective promotion of the safe return of forcibly expelled persons, because the mandate of the force does not permit it to take any action. In essence, the troops have been reduced to frontier troops, behind whose backs excesses are being perpetrated against the civilian population of Gali and other districts of Abkhazia and acts of piracy are being carried out against fishing vessels of the Republic of Georgia.

It is clear that the mandate of the peacemaking force, in its strict interpretation, does not extend to ensuring the safety of forcibly expelled persons, one of the primary tasks of peacemaking forces, according to the statement of the Council on the Collective Security of the Commonwealth of Independent States dated 15 April 1994.

There is an increasingly urgent need to assign police functions to these forces, or to attach special subunits to them, capable of protecting the civilian population from the arbitrary acts of the "Abkhaz police", made up of former militants, and to ensuring the safety of UNHCR personnel in the conflict zone.

The CIS leadership has started to take appropriate measures to that end, but so far without tangible results.

The time has also come for the necessary preparatory measures to be taken in the Psou river region, where refugees are expected to cross in accordance with the arrangements agreed upon in Sochi at the meeting between President Yeltsin and the Georgian Head of State, Mr. Shevardnadze.

14. Steps must be taken to reorganize the United Nations military observer mission, as the Abkhaz authorities can so easily block its access to places where executions of civilians are being carried out or where there are flagrant violations of the cease-fire agreement.

In order to discharge the functions assigned to it pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 937 (1994), the United Nations mission should have the right to visit any district, both inside and outside the conflict zone, without the consent of the parties to the conflict. Failing that, the mission will remain paralysed and it will be unable to facilitate the safe return of forcibly expelled persons, which is indisputably one of its functions pursuant to the Agreement of 14 May 1994 and Security Council resolution 937 (1994).

In general terms, it is essential for the United Nations military observer mission to cover the entire territory of Abkhazia, for, as things stand, no one is monitoring the situation outside the security zone. As noted above, refugees are also expected to return by crossing the Psou river, yet so far neither the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) nor the peacemaking forces have been deployed there.

We might recall that, in accordance with the arrangements agreed upon back in 1993, the observers should have monitored the disarming of the armed formations and individuals who had come to take part in the conflict and their expulsion across the Psou river (Communiqué on the second round of negotiations, para. 2, 22 February 1994).

But this process has not even commenced and this section of the Georgian-Russian frontier is not covered by United Nations observers. In general, no one is monitoring what is going on between the Psou river and the security zone on the Inguri river; consequently, the flagrant violations of human rights and criminal excesses are able to continue.

15. For that reason, the negotiations on the political status of Abkhazia within the Republic of Georgia cannot be effective until the process of the mass return of refugees under the auspices of UNHCR, which has done so much to facilitate the launching of the process, has become irreversible. Consequently, both the peacemaking forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the United Nations military observers must do everything in their power to ensure the safety of this process.

16. We set high store by the efforts of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Brunner, the delegation of the Russian Federation and CSCE, yet up until now the Abkhaz side has stubbornly refused to cooperate in a constructive manner.

17. The time has come to define the fundamental principles for the political status of Abkhazia within the State system of the Republic of Georgia, but only on condition that the process of the mass return of refugees is made irreversible.

The scope of the agreement should include:

1. The inviolability of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia in its present borders, as recognized by the international community of States;

2. The guaranteeing of the statehood of Abkhazia, due account being taken of the special interests of the Abkhaz people, as well as the interests of the multi-ethnic population of Abkhazia;

3. Outside the areas of competence assigned to the organs of power of the Republic of Georgia, the structure of which will be specified by the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia with the participation of representatives of Abkhazia on the basis of reciprocal delegation of powers, Abkhazia will possess the full range of powers established in its Constitution;

4. No change shall take place in the territory of the Republic of Georgia, including the territory of Abkhazia, without the consent of the Parliament of the Republic of Georgia. The frontiers and status of Abkhazia within the overall State system cannot be changed without the consent of the multi-ethnic population of Abkhazia;

5. The list of reciprocally delegated powers shall be given consideration in the light of the democratic processes which accompanied the collapse of the USSR and the need to refashion the State system of Abkhazia, in a new and genuinely democratic form, as dictated by international standards of constitutionalism for a State with a complex State organization.

From the above, it is evident that the Abkhaz side is undermining any possibility for the adoption of constructive decisions on a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia. Things cannot be allowed to continue like this and the United Nations, CSCE, CIS, the Russian Federation and UNHCR must take effective measures to expedite the return of forcibly expelled persons.

The Georgian delegation reserves the right, in the event that the Abkhaz side continues its sabotage and violation of the decisions that have been adopted, in particular, the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council to take effective and drastic measures.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1334
28 November 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force of 18 November 1994 (S/1994/1311),

Decides:

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months, that is, until 31 May 1995;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of this period, a report on the development in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

94-47305 (E) 291194 301194

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1335
23 November 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 NOVEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The situation in the Bihać pocket safe area is deteriorating at an ever increasing rate. The so-called Krajina and Bosnian Serb forces continue to advance on Bihać town, employing infantry and heavy artillery shelling attacks. The directions of these attacks are from Skocaj and Debeljaca, Zavalje, Licko Petrovo Selo and Vedro Polje.

Also, these combined Serb forces have taken a portion of Mount Debeljaca on the outskirts of the town. Thousands of refugees are streaming out of the village of Sokolać, Privilica, Zegar, and Vedro Polje towards Bihać. Serb forces have taken to shelling the fleeing refugees as well as continuing their shelling of the town itself. The spokesman for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Mr. Peter Kessler, stated this morning that "bodies are lying where they fall". Bihać hospital, among many other civilian objects, continues to be subject to shelling.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

94-46386 (E) 231194 251194

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1336
24 November 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 NOVEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ANGOLA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit the following statement by the Republic of Angola dated 21 November 1994, with the request that this document be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Afonso VAN-DUNEM ("Mbinda")
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

94-46572 (E) 241194 251194

/...

Angolan Government denounces UNITA military activities subsequent to Sunday's peace accord

..Government statement dated 21 November 1994 on the political military situation

1. The Government of the Republic of Angola denounces before domestic and international public opinion the grave situation that exists at this moment in the (provincial capital) city of Uige. At 1000 this morning, UNITA forces under the command of General Antonio Dembo, also Vice-President of the UNITA organization, initiated a large-scale assault to recapture the city. Long-range artillery, in addition to other weapons, has been employed.

2. Yesterday, at the precise moment in which the signing ceremony was taking place in Lusaka, UNITA initiated an attack against the municipality of Cacolo, Lunda Norte Province. The attack was beaten back by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA).

3. Given the truce violations, the Angolan Armed Forces reserves the right to respond to any offensive actions on the part of UNITA military forces.

4. The Government of the Republic of Angola invites UNITA leaders to take a constructive position and develop efforts that will not frustrate this historic opportunity for Angolan people to live in peace.

5. The Government of Angola calls the attention of the international community to this senseless UNITA attitude that places in danger the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.